Abstract: This article adds two elements to a standard model of monopolistic competition:
Introduction
Empirical studies of the process of entry and industry evolution have identified various characteristics which are not captured by standard textbook models of entry (see, for instance, the detailed study by Geroski, 1991) . One of these features is the joint occurrence of exit and entry. Another is the fact that some firms stay in an industry for a long time while other firms exit quite soon after they have entered. This article presents a model in which both of these features can be equilibrium outcomes. The model formalizes the idea of windows of profit opportunities (see Geroski, 1991) . Firms that cannot survive in the long run may nevertheless be willing to bear sunk entry costs because of profit opportunities for a sufficient amount of time.
The model's key assumptions are derived from two further empirical observations:
First, in the early stages of many industries, the number of potential entrants is limited in each period of time and increases only over time. Klepper and Graddy (1990) attribute this limitation to the fact that firms need a certain expertise to enter an industry. The relevant knowledge is available only to agents who for instance, are experienced in related
technologies. An example of the importance of the relevant experience is given by Klepper and Simons (2000) . They show that prior knowledge from the production of radios was decisive for entry into the television receiver industry in the early stages of that industry. Klepper and Simons (2000) argue that 'radio producers were well positioned early to learn about technological developments in TVs' (p. 1003). Therefore, radio producers would 'qualify earlier as a potential entrant' (ibid., emphasis added). For the laser industry, Sleeper (1998) finds that entry often occurs by spin-offs from existing laser firms. This, and the findings from TVs, suggests that entry requires a prior period of learning about the industry.
This necessity limits the number of potential entrants at each point in time.
Second, entrants often differ with respect to their capabilities, i.e., they are heterogeneous. In the management literature, the question seems not to be whether the initial allocation of firms' capabilities differs, but to what extent firms are able to change despite organizational inertia. There is considerable debate on the scope for firms to adapt their capabilities.
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Together with sunk costs, limitations on the number of potential entrants and heterogeneity yield a simple model in which the process of entry can take on a wide range of patterns. Depending on the sequence of the number and type of potential entrants, the degree of difference between the firm types, and the magnitudes of sunk and fixed costs, various patterns of industry evolution can be distinguished. First, a pattern can arise which I call the product life cycle as it resembles the patterns described by Klepper (1996) . Second, path dependence may result in the sense that the long run composition of the number and types of firms depends on the sequence of potential entrants. Finally, the 'traditional' case may arise in which only 'efficient' firms enter the market.
The starting point of the model is the market structure of monopolistic competition.
Monopolistic competition is formalized here using a variant of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976) . The 'large group' assumption (Chamberlin, 1933) underlying this market structure ensures virtually no strategic interaction among firms. Nevertheless, individual firms have monopoly power due to producing a special brand of a differentiated product. Features such as tractability -even though there is imperfect competition -led to widespread use of this market structure (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . Monopolistic competition is particularly well suited for the discussion of entry dynamics and industry evolution for two further reasons. First, sunk costs, which are quite important for the pattern of industry evolution (see, for instance, Dixit, 1989, and Lambson, 1992) , seem to be substantial in markets for differentiated products (see, e.g., Sutton, 1991) .
Second, the theoretical argument that supports the assumption of an unlimited number of potential entrants does not apply to Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. This argument is based on the notion of 'imitative entry' meaning that a firm just copies the product and the strategy of an incumbent firm. If imitative entry were possible, the number of potential entrants should not be limited. However, as Geroski (1991, p. 178) argues, empirically product differentiation establishes barriers to entry which are especially high for imitative entrants, but which may not be a major impediment for the entry of innovative firms.
The Chamberlinian monopolistic competition model captures this argument since Bertrand competition among the producers of the differentiated product precludes imitative entry. The agents who have ideas for new products and find their niches in the market are, nevertheless, able to enter. As I shall assume below, the number of these 'smart' agents will not be large enough to immediately drive profits down to zero.
Turning to normative issues, the model allows the evaluation of economic policy in a field in which governments seem to be particularly active. Various political initiatives indicate that policymakers view entry to happen both on an insufficient scale and too slowly. The
German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, for instance, supports programs on entrepreneurship.
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The aim of these initiatives is to develop an 'entrepreneurial culture' leading to an increased number of business start-ups. While it is not straightforward how such programs affect the number of potential entrants, it is obvious that some potential entrants for whom entry is not profitable without support, may enter if they get subsidies. The model shows that such a governmental activity increases welfare at the margin even in the case that Strategic Management Journal, 2000. Of particular interest is Cockburn et al., 2000. is the most unfavorable one for the politicians, namely the path dependence case: the policy increases the number of 'inefficient' firms and thereby reduces the long run number of 'efficient' firms.
In general, my welfare analysis largely confirms the results for the static model of monopolistic competition derived by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Assuming that a social planner cannot change the number of potential entrants, I find that the number of firms entering the market in a decentralized solution is too small compared to both first-and second-best welfare measures. The result contrasts with the excess entry result of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) .
The difference stems from the fact that product differentiation plays an important role in my model. Entry increases consumers' utility even if prices and quantities consumed do not change. The reason is that consumers value the increase in variety. Again, this feature seems to be particularly important when dealing with innovative entry.
In the literature a number of explanations for the characteristics of the entry process are offered. One approach is based on the notion of entry as a selection mechanism (Jovanovic, 1982) . Contrary to the firms in my paper, Jovanovic assumes that firms are not sure about some of their characteristics. By entering the market, they learn about their capabilities andbased on the new knowledge -they decide to either stay in the market or exit soon.
Uncertainty plays a decisive role. No entry of 'wrong' firms would occur if they knew their type.
Uncertainty also plays a key role in Lambson (1992) and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) . In these models uncertainty relates to variables external to firms. Shocks to input prices or to demand can explain simultaneous entry and exit in Lambson (1992) . The random arrival of exogenous innovations leads to a life cycle pattern of industry evolution in Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) . Both models assume perfect competition with an unlimited number of potential entrants. Due to sunk costs, Lambson's (1992) model also exhibits path dependence for certain parameter values.
My model shows that many of the stylized facts of industry evolution can be explained without relying on uncertainty. While the model is best thought of as being complementary to the above-mentioned approaches, it highlights the importance of the number of potential entrants in an environment of sunk costs. Absence of uncertainty is also a feature of Petrakis et al. (1997) and Petrakis and Roy (1999) . In their perfect competition models, a shakeout may occur as well. The reason is yet another limitation, namely a restriction on the optimum scale of production which is removed only over time. Due to learning by doing (Petrakis et al. 1997 ) and cost reducing R&D (Petrakis and Roy, 1999) , respectively, firms adjust to their long run output level only over time. As firms grow although the demand schedule is given, some firms may have to exit due to sharply decreasing prices. While this mechanism can explain shakeouts, both models do not exhibit simultaneous entry and exit. Furthermore, no entry occurs after the first period.
A paper that shares some of the key elements of my model is Klepper (1996) The assumption of a limited number of potential entrants is also made in Klepper and Graddy (1990) . In this model of price-taking firms with different costs, capacity constraints, which can only gradually be removed, are decisive for the evolution of the industry. Situations like the path dependence case cannot arise in this model of homogeneous goods producers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 present the model and its dynamic equilibrium, respectively. In Section 4, first-and second-best welfare results are derived. Section 5 concludes.
The model
The model describes the evolution of a market for a differentiated product in discrete time. The industry consists of a continuum of firms. For simplicity I refer to the measure of firms as the 'number of firms'. Each of the firms active in the industry produces a single, unique variety of the differentiated product. Therefore, the number of firms equals the number of brands available to the consumers.
The consumers
Consumers maximize utility over an infinite horizon. Their intertemporal preferences are assumed to be identical. Preferences of a consumer take on the form
Here y t denotes the quantity of a numeraire and A and e are (positive) parameters. The discount factor R is related to the rate of time preference r as follows:
clear from the notation, the consumer's rate of time preference is assumed to be equal to the interest rate r. The index C t describes the sub-utility from the consumption of the differentiated product. C t is of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type and is defined as ( ) ideas are not all alike in terms of the value they convey to the consumer. I assume that potential entrants differ with respect to the consumers' valuations of the variety they could produce. As in Yarrow (1985) , the differences may be interpreted as differences in quality or in design. 
R y p j t x j t dj I
where I denotes the consumer's total discounted income and p(j,t) is the price of variety j in time t. I furthermore assume that income is large compared to the expenditure for the differentiated product. This ensures that the consumer will demand the numeraire y t . For simplicity, I assume that the number (that is the measure) of consumers is 1. The aggregate demand is therefore identical to the demand of the single consumer considered above. With the above assumptions, one gets the instantaneous demand function x(i,t) for variety i at time t (for the derivation see, for instance, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Chapter 3): 
This demand function differs in two respects from the Dixit-Stiglitz type demand functions typically used, for instance, in growth theory (see Grossman and Helpman 1991 
The demand function (3) is isoelastic with the elasticity of demand 
total per-period expenditure on the differentiated goods can be written as follows:
j t x j t dj A P
This equation gives the following relationship between the consumption and the price index:
-10 -Equation (6) describes a standard isoelastic demand function. The elasticity ε of the consumption index with respect to the price index can now be calculated as
( )
1 1 e ε = − − . As the elasticity is greater than 1 (in absolute terms), the expenditures on the differentiated product will increase if P decreases. In order for the varieties of the differentiated product to be substitutes rather than complements, the elasticity of substitution between two varieties (σ) must be greater (in absolute terms) than ε. Therefore, I assume that e α > .
The firms
The technology in the differentiated goods industry is as follows. Firms that are entering the industry have to bear sunk costs S. These sunk costs may be interpreted as either product development or advertisement costs for the special brand or as an investment in specialized equipment that cannot be recovered in case of exit. In addition to the sunk costs that arise only once, there are costs to be incurred in each period in which the firm is active. These costs are assumed to be composed of constant marginal costs c and a fixed cost F. Both c and F are identical across firms and constant over time.
In the Chamberlin model all firms are price setters. The isoelastic demand function gives rise to a simple mark-up pricing rule for given marginal costs c (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977, and Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . For the profit-maximizing price p one gets p c = α.
Here the firm index has been dropped because all firms face identical demand elasticities and have identical marginal costs. Therefore all firms will charge the same price. The demand for the different firms' varieties will, however, differ if the valuations b differ. Rather than charging a price premium, firms offering the higher valued brands use their competitive advantage entirely for output expansion. The technical reason for this result is that the specification of firm heterogeneity does not change the elasticity of demand. This property fits well with the above interpretation that the lower valued varieties attract a smaller number of consumers from the heterogeneous population.
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Interpreting the differences among firms as different qualities, in general one would expect that higher qualities sell for higher prices (see, e.g., Anderson and de Palma, 2001 ). This feature could be integrated into the model by using a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) utility function rather than the CES consumption index used here. However, this would complicate the calculations considerably without, as I expect, changing the main results. Therefore, I stay with the simpler CES version.
As regards heterogeneity among firms, for simplicity, I assume that only two different types of firms exist, a low (L-type firms) and a high (H-type firms) valuation type. The consumers' valuation for the low type is normalized to unity, the valuation for the H-type firms is a constant b > 1. Given this specification, consumers and a social planner would, ceteris paribus, prefer to have only H-type firms. Therefore, these firms might be called 'efficient' firms as I did in the introduction.
Denoting the number of active firms of each type by n L and n H , respectively, operating profits π i for each type i = L, H can be determined as a function of the number and type of a firm's rivals.
( )
and ( ) 
In the derivation of these profit functions the pricing rule (7) has been used. From the operating profits fixed costs must be deducted in order to get the per-period profits. (8) and (9) demonstrate the importance of the assumption that e < α. Otherwise each firm's (operating)
profit would increase if the number of firms increases.
The equilibrium of the model
The equilibrium industry evolution is presented in a number of propositions below. The propositions show how industry evolution depends on the parameters of the model, especially on the sequences
k t k t of the number and types of potential entrants. Here k L (t)
(k H (t)) denotes the number of L-type (H-type) potential entrants arriving at the market in period t, where t ∈ ô 0 . An important assumption about the sequences is that they are common knowledge as of the time of market birth. Industry evolution may go through several stages.
For easy reference I introduce the following symbols for periods in which the described events take place. 
-13 -For L-type firms to be active in the long run, they must at least be able to cover their fixed costs in each period. Thus, the inequality
Therefore, we obtain a lower bound for the discounted profits Π H an H-type firm receives if L-type firms are active:
The sign of the expression on the r.h.s of (11) determines the long run properties of the model. Therefore, I assume:
From the above reasoning it is clear that L-type firms cannot be active in the long run if A1 holds. The number of H-type firms would otherwise always be increasing.
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If no L-type firms are active in the long run, the long run number of H-type firms, n H , is determined by the zero profit condition
We obtain ( ) 
Under A1 all potential H-type entrants will enter the market until the number of H-type active firms is n H . In more formal terms, the evolution of the number of H-type firms is determined by the sequence
The last entry of H-type firms occurs in the period in which the cumulated number of potential 
where t c is the first period at which 
will hold if the speed at which H-type potential entrants firms arrive in the market is low.
In this case the number of H-type firms increases slowly over time leaving room for the L-type firms to recover their sunk costs. The pattern of industry evolution that arises in situations to which Propositions 1 to 3 apply is the 'product life cycle'. The simulation presented in Figure 1 gives an example of industry evolution in this case. In the long run, only H-type firms survive.
The above description demonstrates that my model can account for the two empirical features of entry mentioned in the introduction, namely, the joint occurrence of exit and entry and the fact that firms differ with respect to their lifespan. In the simulation, exit and entry occur in 1/3 of the time in which transition to the long run takes place. The life-span of L-type firms varies between some 40 and 105 periods. The model also exhibits the phenomenon of a shakeout. The driving force for the shakeout is the replacement of less efficient firms by more efficient entrants. Note that after the shake-out phase the total number of firms starts growing again. In Figure 1 , growth even leads to the result that the long run number of firms coincides with the maximum number of firms ever active in the industry. This, however, need not be the case as Figure 2 below shows. What is a consequence of the model, however, is that entry goes on after the shakeout. While this feature contradicts patterns of industry shakeout described by Klepper (1996) , it fits with new findings by Carroll and Hannan (2000) . For several industries, e.g. automobile manufacturers in France, they find that entry of new firms and products takes place after a consolidation phase. In his review of Carroll and Hannan (2000) , Jovanovic (2001) argues that the list of industry-life-cycle facts might need a modification to include a stage of secondary entry. Now I turn to the case where A1 is not satisfied. The discussion of A1 has shown that an L-type firm which has made the sunk investment will never exit the industry in this case. The operating profits π L will never fall short of the fixed costs F. Whether L-type firms find it worthwhile to enter in the first place, and how many L-type firms will enter the industry 
N L and the dates t a and t d exist and are unique.
Proof: see Appendix.
Note that the path dependence result implies that industry structure is asymmetric even in the long run. Initial differences form the basis of long run heterogeneity. Proposition 4 also shows that 'bad', early entrants deter 'good' but late potential entrants from entering in the path dependence case. Producers of low value goods, however, can never deter entry of high value good producers completely (the derivative of (18) with respect to n L is smaller than 1 andn L < n H ). Some H-type producers are always able to break even because of higher operating profits but identical investment costs compared to L-type firms. As the discussion of A2 and the following proposition show the 'deterrence' result depends crucially on the speed at which potential H-type firms arrive in the market. The above propositions show how various factors shape industry evolution. One key factor is the sequence of the number of potential (H-type) entrants. It determines whether A2 is satisfied and thus whether one departs from the textbook case of entry or not. I examine the impact of different sequences of potential entrants on industry evolution in simulations below.
Before doing that, however, it is instructive to look at the factors underlying A1. Given that A2 holds, these factors are decisive for the long run properties of the model. The respective variables determine whether existence of L-type firms is a transitional or a long run phenomenon. As it turns out, the effects of these variables are quite intuitive. First, consider the degree by which the valuations of the varieties differ. It is straightforward that the path dependence case is more likely to apply, if these differences in the valuations are small (i.e. b is close to 1).
Next, consider the effect of the parameter α. It determines the degree of substitutability between varieties as well as the demand elasticity. Path dependence is more likely to occur if α is small. Small values of α imply limited substitutability among varieties and low demand elasticities. Even though valued higher by consumers, the market 'share' gains of H-type products are limited. We obtain the intuitive result that L-type firms survive in the long run if the degree of (exogenous) product differentiation is high as it is with small values of α.
Finally, look at fixed and sunk costs. Path dependence applies if sunk costs S are large compared to fixed costs F. Note that the path dependence case requires sunk costs to be positive. If there are no sunk costs, the product life cycle or the textbook case will result. This follows from the fact that per-period profits of H-type firms, i.e. their operating profits minus fixed costs, are always greater than the respective numbers for the L-type firms. As regards fixed costs, notice that A1 could not be satisfied if fixed costs were absent. Thus, with zero fixed costs, we obtain path dependence. The per-period profits of inefficient firms cannot become negative. Therefore, an L-type firm, which once became active, can never be driven out of the market.
A1 also sheds light on how much better the next generation of a product must be in order to completely drive out the state of the art product. To see this, interpret the producers of the next generation as H-type potential entrants, which arrive at the market well after market birth. A1 shows how much better (in terms of b) the next generation must be in order to gain the whole market. It can therefore be thought of as a formalization of the popular '10X rule'.
Used by venture capitalists, this rule of thumb states that a new product should be backed only if it is (perceived to be) 10 times better than the product it is supposed to replace. If the 10X rule does not apply, the product will fail to replace the old product. An example for a 'successful' product is the CD, which replaced the vinyl record. Failures where the digital audio tape (DAT) and the digital compact cassette (DCC). Both innovations didn't pass the 
Welfare analysis
As mentioned in the introduction, policy makers seem to become particularly active when it comes to supporting entry of new firms. Different arguments are stated for such a policy, e.g. labor market effects or the development of a more dynamic and innovative economy. Irrespective of the reasons for supporting entry, there seems to be a political consensus that more entry is better in general.
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My model gives the opportunity to evaluate such a policy in a framework where a binding constraint on the extent of entry exists. Due to this feature government policy is likely to pick 'losers', i.e. inefficient firms. The welfare analysis of this section will give an answer on how to judge such a policy.
The welfare analysis assumes that the social planner cannot change the number of potential entrants. In order to address welfare issues, I derive the consumers' indirect utility function. Using (2) 
In this expression I have used (5) 
As a benchmark, I mention the result for the traditional case (Proposition 5). From Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) it is immediately apparent that the number of firms which are eventually active in the market solution is too small compared to the first-best social optimum. The respective optimization problem
where FB H n is the first-best number of H-type firms. As equation (24) shows the extent of the deviation of the market solution from the planner solution depends on the mark-up the firms charge.
While the first-best result is a useful benchmark, it seems sensible for many questions of economic policy to apply measures that do not rely on marginal cost pricing. Following Spence (1976) , two constrained social optimization problems may be distinguished.
1. The planner cannot influence the conduct, i.e. the price setting behavior of the firms.
However, the planner can choose the number of firms. To implement such a policy either entry subsidies or entry fees are necessary. This criterion was used, for instance, by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) .
2. The planner optimizes prices subject to a zero profit constraint. Using this criterion, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) come up with the conclusion that the market solution under monopolistic competition is second-best.
Here I focus on the first criterion as it seems to be more relevant for the policy measures I want to evaluate than the more restrictive second criterion. Contrary to the assumption underlying the latter criterion, governments actually seem to subsidize entry out of the general budget.
Again the derivation of the second-best result is straightforward. The planner's optimization problem consists of the maximization of the sum of the consumers' surplus and the profits of the firms. In the traditional case with only H-type firms active it reads ( )
The result for the second-best number of firms, 
Thus, the underentry result extends also to the constrained optimum. Using a less restrictive criterion than the break-even constraint of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) yields a case for entry subsidization, even if a government cannot change the pricing behavior of firms. Obviously, the consumer surplus effect associated with of an additional entrant dominates the business stealing effect.
As far as the relation between first-best and second-best number of firms is concerned, a formal result is not available. Calculations for specific parameters indicate that the first-best number is greater. Note that the second-best number of firms approaches the first-best as e goes to 0. The respective outputs of the firms differ, however. This is clear from the fact that with e = 0 aggregate expenditure on the differentiated products is constant. Given the number of firms, the prices are higher in the second-best case, therefore quantities must be smaller. In general, the second-best solution trades-off the efficiency loss due to a sub-optimal scale with the welfare gain due to increased variety of products.
The variety effect also explains the difference to the excess entry result derived by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for a homogeneous good oligopoly. In the Dixit-Stiglitz model, entry takes on the form of innovative entry implying that the range of differentiated products increases. This leads to welfare effects which go beyond a simple increase in competition.
There is a caveat regarding the underentry result. Anderson et al. (1995) show that even in the case of product differentiation and love of variety, the market solution may exhibit too many firms from a social point of view. A detailed discussion of the empirical relevance of the different specifications is beyond the scope of this paper. I only want to make two points why the policy conclusions drawn on the basis of my model are relevant. First, the underentry result corresponds to the above mentioned 'conventional wisdom' of policy makers. Second, the result is consistent with Geroski (1991) stating that one can hardly imagine that there is too much entry. Geroski's argument is based on the view that consumers' needs are diverse.
More entry, especially of different types, is likely to improve the fit produced by the market selection process. Now I turn to welfare in the path dependence case. The welfare analysis is performed by evaluating the effects of a small policy. That is, I calculate the derivative of the social welfare function with respect to the number of both H-type and L-type firms. Evaluation of the respective derivative at the market solution tells us whether a social planner wants to have more or fewer firms of both types. Thus, starting from the market solution the planner decides both whether she wants to have more entry of L-type firms in period t a and whether the number of H-type firms should still increase in period t d . Proposition 6 shows that the planner actually chooses more firms of both types than the market solution. Note, however, that the trade-off between the first-best numbers of the both types is the same as in the market solution: If the L-type firms come in faster so that N L increases, N H decreases by (18) Proposition 7 shows that even this policy intervention increases welfare (at least as long as it is small). The policy does not have welfare effects in the long run (from t d onwards) as the change in the number and composition of firms is such that neither the profits nor the utility of the consumers is changed. The short run gains in consumers' surplus obviously more than compensate for the reduced profits of the firms between t a to t d . The result not only confirms Geroski's (1991) abovementioned statement that there is hardly too much entry.
From the perspective of the above analysis, one would like to add that this is even true for the entry of low quality firms. As mentioned in the introduction, this result is driven by the fact that even 'inefficient' firms increase the variety of products available to the consumers.
The final welfare issue I want to address deals with the amount of 'transitory entry' by L-type firms in the product life cycle.
Proposition 8: Starting from the market solution of the product life cycle case (Propositions 1 and 2 apply) and taking the pricing behaviour of the firms as given, a marginal increase in the number of L-type firms increases welfare.
Proof: See Appendix.
The result is analogous to that in the path dependence case. From a second-best perspective, it is optimal to encourage more firms to enter than the number that would enter in an unregulated market. Rather than 'closing the windows of profit opportunities', policy should promote entry by L-type firms. The loss of sunk investments, which is due to the future exit, is more than compensated by the short-term gains.
Conclusions
In this paper, two elements have been added to a standard model of monopolistic competition: First, the number of potential entrants is limited in each period and increases only over time. Second, the potential entrants differ with respect to the consumers' valuation of the variant they could offer. It has been shown that the resulting simple model exhibits a rich dynamic structure covering cases like the product life cycle, a path dependent equilibrium and the traditional textbook case of entry. The model shows that adding a time dimension to a static model does not merely yield transitional dynamics but may well have long-term consequences if sunk costs exist.
At this point a remark on the type of heterogeneity present in the model is in order. In general, firms could differ along various dimensions apart from consumers' valuations of the product. An obvious candidate for differences among firms are costs, where marginal as well as fixed and sunk costs could be the source of heterogeneity. The results of the model regarding industry evolution should carry over to these cases as well. It is no problem to deal with cost asymmetries in the present framework. The reason for choosing differences in consumers' valuation is that -in my view-these are most likely to endure in the long run whereas cost differences might be eroded over time by imitation. Ultimately, what type of heterogeneity is more long-lived is an empirical question which still remains unanswered (see, e.g., Cockburn et al. (2000) ).
Regarding policy conclusions, the welfare analysis confirms Geroski's opinion that one can hardly imagine that there is too much entry (Geroski, 1991) . Even subsidizing the entry of 'inefficient' firms improves welfare if these firms add variety to the consumers' choice. As discussed in some detail in section 4, the welfare results are sensitive to the functional specification of the model. This is different as far as the positive analysis is concerned. The derived patterns of industry evolution depend on general factors, namely product differentiation, sunk costs, and heterogeneity of firms, rather than the functional specification.
While the model is a perfect foresight model, from the point of view of (most) potential entrants the rationality requirements are weaker. For H-type firms, it is sufficient to know whether they break even if no further firms entered the market. That is, they do not have to care about future entry. L-type firms must have an idea whether their window of profit opportunities is wide enough. If future entry is sufficiently slow, they are able to break even.
While the model does not allow for uncertainty on the rate at which new entrants arrive, the basic intuition should carry over to the case where the sequence of the number and types of future potential entrants is random, but drawn from a distribution which is known. A bigger problem seems to be the question whether and how this sequence should and could be endogenized. Here spin-offs from incumbent firms as well as entry from industries with relevant experience seem to be important determinants. While research on this topic has begun (see Klepper and Simons, 2000) , the question of how entrepreneurs are 'produced' by an economy is far from being answered. Like the introduction of additional elements like innovations into the framework presented here, this question seems to be a promising direction for future research and a problem for which policy makers are badly in need of a solution.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The statement on entry and exit follows immediately from A2
and from the discussion of Proposition 1. The last exit of low value good producers occurs in the period in which the condition
holds for the first time. This yields: 
Existence and uniqueness of N L and t a follow from A2 (discounted profits must exceed S for t a = 0 and n L = 0) and from the fact that the l.h.s. of (29) is strictly decreasing in N L . In (29), the fact is used that per-period profits of L-type firms are 0 from t b onwards. t b is the earliest date at which
The existence 
Using (9) and (14), it can be seen that the function (18) 
As changes are absent in the periods before t a the respective expressions have been dropped. 
This expression is now evaluated at the market solution using the zero profit condition for the L-type firms, which defines N L . The zero profit condition can be written as (see (32) 
Using (35) in (34) yields:
Taking the derivative of W with respect to N H , results in: 
The zero profit condition for H-type firms can be written as (see (31)) 
Using (38) in (37) one obtains the same expression as in (36), namely
As welfare is strictly concave in N H and N L (as can be derived from (34) and (37)), the firstbest number of both L-type and H-type firms is greater than the number of such firms active in the market solution.
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition
In this expression, the fact has been used that the profits of the last entrants of the H-type must be equal to the sunk costs. The welfare effects of a small change in N H can be calculated from the derivative ( ) 
This expression is unambiguously greater than zero. That proves the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Welfare is described by 
Note that the periods before t a , the last entry of an L-type firm, and from t b , the first exit of an L-type firm, onwards do not matter here. Nothing changes in this periods. Taking the derivative of (43) with respect to N L and performing the same steps like in the proof of proposition 4, one gets an expression, which is equivalent to (41).
( ) 10 Note that the periods should be thought of as months. In this case the yearly interest rate is about 10%.
Notice also that I assumed the number of potential entrants to be the same in each period. The parameters are α =½, e =1/4, b =3/2, A =50, c =1,
